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 Voicing an Opinion: Authorship, 
Collaboration and the Judgments of 
Justice Bertha Wilson 
Marie-Claire Belleau, Rebecca Johnson, Christina Vinters∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Bertha Wilson’s Betcherman Lecture, “Will Women Judges 
Really Make a Difference?”1 remains one of the most highly cited 
articles by a judge. Certainly, the question she posed in the title is at the 
heart of any number of empirical projects considering the role that 
identity plays in judicial decision-making. It was thus with interest that 
we returned to the text of her speech years after each of us first read it. 
Given the controversy that had swirled around the text so many years 
ago, we found ourselves reflecting on the surprising moderation of the 
piece. With the passage of time, the speech now seemed to us a quite 
modest meditation on the role of the judge, the nature of “impartiality”, 
and the obligation to judge fairly and objectively. The most provocative 
dimension of the article might well be the title. And it is the title that we 
begin with: “Will women judges make a difference?” 
But though we, like her, take up the terms “women judges”, “make” 
and “difference”, we wish to spin them in slightly different directions. 
For in asking about difference, our interest is not so much in questions of 
judicial identity: who a judge is, or the ways in which elements of 
identity (whether gender, race, class, religion or political affiliation) 
might influence the substance of a judge’s opinions. Rather, using 
Canada’s first woman Supreme Court justice as our point of departure, 
we consider the nature of judicial work — the business of “making” the 
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 Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 507. 
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law through the production of written judicial opinions. While 
“difference” is a big preoccupation for us, our interest in this piece is 
less in the question of whether or not men and women judge differently, 
than in the fact of difference between judges: “differences of opinion” 
between judges that find textual expression in the form of published 
dissenting opinions. 
In Part II, we take a brief empirical turn, and spend some time 
counting cases, seeking to sketch a portrait of Justice Wilsons’ judicial 
work, attending to types of opinions (unanimous, majority, dissenting, 
partially dissenting, concurring), and methods of participation (signing 
and authoring). We contextualize this portrait by considering Justice 
Wilson’s work alongside that of colleagues with whom she sat. There 
are two strands in this data. The first, very visible in Part I, focuses 
attention on particular judges, raising questions about difference, voice 
and identity. In Part III, influenced by the insights of institutional 
ethnography, we reflect on a second strand in the data, one which 
suggests room for more attention to the complex collaborative and 
institutional dimensions to the production of law. If the empirical 
snapshot can encourage attention to the role of difference in the work of 
Canada’s first woman Supreme Court judge, it should also encourage 
attention to the place of difference more generally in the making of law. 
Attention to the judgments of Justice Bertha Wilson can enable a robust 
discussion about the production of opinions, as well as nuance in our 
thinking about the implications of collaboration, authorship and voice.  
II. COUNTING TEXTS 
1. Justice Bertha Wilson 
From the time of her appointment in 1982 to her retirement in 1991, 
Justice Bertha Wilson participated in 551 cases that generated written 
reasons. Each written opinion addresses two matters: result and reason. 
The first of these — result — is something that can generally be 
expressed in binary form. Someone wins or loses; there is or is not a 
contract; damages are or are not proved; a child is left with or removed 
from the parent. But it is not enough for a judge to pronounce the “yes or 
no” of result. The judge must also give reasons. The reasons tell us how 
the judge’s thinking process proceeded from the facts to the outcome. 
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The reasons tell us why certain outcomes are desirable, justifiable or 
inevitable:2 why evidence must be thrown out in a given case; how 
children are or are not legal subjects; and why some injuries can happen 
without obligations on the part of others to help.  
In situations where an appellate court produces a unanimous 
opinion, reason and result move together. That unanimous opinion may 
bear the authorial imprint of one of the judge’s names, or it may be 
issued under the nom de plume of “The Court”. But where differences 
emerge between judges — differences that make unanimity impossible 
— the case will result in the production of multiple texts: a majority 
opinion (a text supported by more than half the judges hearing the case), 
and one or more dissenting or concurring opinions. A terminological 
note is in order here, as the identification of a text as dissenting or 
concurring depends on the distinction between result and reason. Where 
the minority judges disagree with the result reached by the majority, the 
opinion is a dissenting one. Where, however, the minority judges agree 
with the result but disagree with the majority reasons, the opinion is a 
concurring one. In English, the word “concur” means “to agree”, but in 
law, the concurrence is a form of disagreement. This is perhaps more 
evident for francophone than anglophone readers since in French, the 
terms dissent and concurrence are rendered as dissidences sur les 
résultats and dissidences sur les motifs. This linguistic marking better 
exposes the distinction between reason and result, and puts emphasis on 
the dissenting nature of both types of opinion. The central point for the 
empirically minded is that, for the purposes of statistical analysis, the 
distinction between a dissent and a concurrence can be problematic: it 
straddles the categories of majority and dissent. If one is concerned 
primarily with the result in a case, a concurrence can be counted with the 
majority. But if one’s concern is with the reasons given, then a 
concurrence can instead be counted as a dissent. 
There is one further wrinkle. Though a concurrence generally 
captures agreement on result and disagreement on reasons, there are 
situations in which there is no majority position on reasons. In such 
situations — plurality judgments — the concurrence is less a form of 
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 As the unanimous court recently said in R. v. Walker, [2008] S.C.J. No. 34, 2008 SCC 
34, at para. 19 (S.C.C.), citing R. v. Sheppard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 
15, 24 (S.C.C.): “Reasons for judgment are the primary mechanism by which judges account to the 
parties and to the public for the decisions they render. […] Interested members of the public can 
satisfy themselves that justice has been done, or not, as the case may be.” 
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disagreement with the majority than an articulation of one of several 
possible stances in a context where a stable centre has not yet formed. 
While such an opinion is also labelled a “concurrence”, there are some 
good reasons for separately exploring concurrences produced in the 
context of plurality judgments, from those articulated against the 
background of a majority position.  
In Table 1 below, we have captured all 553 opinions3 in which 
Justice Bertha Wilson was implicated, separated both by type of opinion 
(unanimous, majority, concurring, dissenting,) and by Justice Wilsons’ 
status as either “author” or “signatory” of each of these opinions. 
TABLE 1 
Justice Wilson at the Supreme Court of Canada 
(March 4, 1982 to January 4, 1991) 
Wilson’s Involvement Number Percentage 
 Wrote for unanimous court  41  7.4% 
 Signed with unanimous court  213  38.5% 
 Judgment delivered by “The Court”  48  8.7% 
subtotal  302  54.6% 
 Wrote majority opinion  22  4.0% 
 Signed majority opinion  79  14.3% 
subtotal  101  18.3% 
 Wrote concurrence in plurality  
 judgment  30  5.4% 
 Signed concurrence in plurality  
 judgment  7  1.3% 
 Wrote a concurring opinion  35  6.3% 
 Signed a concurring opinion  9  1.6% 
                                                                                                             
3
 Though she participated in 551 opinion-generating cases, she is implicated in 553 
opinions, because she signed two opinions in two cases: R. v. A., [1990] S.C.J. No. 43, [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.) (she signed Cory J.’s majority opinion and a concurrence by Sopinka J.); and 
N.B.C. v. Retail Clerks’ Union, [1984] S.C.J. No. 15, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 269 (S.C.C.) (where she 
signed the per curiam reasons of Chouinard J., and a concurrence by Beetz J.). In each of these two 
cases she signed a majority and a concurring opinion, affirming results, but showing herself open to 
two sets of reasons. 
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Justice Wilson at the Supreme Court of Canada 
(March 4, 1982 to January 4, 1991) 
Wilson’s Involvement Number Percentage 
subtotal  81  14.6% 
 Wrote a dissenting opinion  41  7.4% 
 Signed a dissenting opinion  17  3.1% 
 Wrote a partial dissent  10  1.8% 
 Signed a partial dissent  0  0.0% 
 Took no part in judgment  1  0.2% 
subtotal  69  12.5% 
TOTAL  553  100% 
 
One of the first things to note is the predominance of agreement. 
Justice Wilson heard 551 cases, and was a signatory to 302 unanimous 
opinions (41 that she wrote, 213 which were authored by other judges, 
and 48 under the name of “The Court”). She was part of a unanimous 
Court nearly 55 per cent of the time. If the majority and unanimous 
opinions are added together, one can further say that Justice Wilson 
shared the views of her colleagues over 70 per cent of the time.  
When it comes to difference, the chart shows us that Justice Wilson, 
where she diverged from the majority, was slightly more likely to differ 
over the reasons, than over the results: she was more likely to be part of 
a concurrence than part of a dissent. For those with an empirical bent, 
there is an element of choice in how to think about those concurrences in 
the context of her work. If one’s interest is primarily in results, one 
might bundle the concurrences with the majority opinions, rather than 
with the dissenting ones. 
One might take the opinions above, and consider separately those 
she signed from those she authored. Justice Wilson is the author of 179 
opinions. This means that in nearly one-third of the cases in which she 
participated, there is an opinion bearing her name as author. Peter 
McCormick reminds us that it is worth distinguishing the minority 
opinions a judge writes from those the judge signs: the propensities for 
these two modes of support do not tend to echo one another.4 Justice 
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 Peter McCormick, “With Respect — Levels of Disagreement on the Lamer Court 1990-
2000” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 89, at 98. According to McCormick, joining a separate opinion 
happens only three-fifths on average as often as writing one. With Justice Wilson, the numbers are 
even lower, and she signs the dissent of another only two-fifths as often as authoring one. 
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Wilson’s production seems to follow this pattern. Of the texts she 
authored, for example, there are an equal number of unanimous and 
dissenting opinions (41 of each). But if one considers the texts she 
signed, the 213 unanimous opinions overwhelm the 17 dissents. Below, 
Figures 1 and 2 provide a portrait of the different modes of support in 
the “signed” judgments (373 opinions), and the “authored” judgments 
(179 opinions). 
FIGURE 1 
 
FIGURE 2 
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Placed side by side, these two figures show starkly different patterns 
of judgment in Justice Wilson’s signed and authored opinions. Certainly, 
one can see that unanimity is the dominant theme in the signed 
judgments. She was a signatory to 373 opinions, and in less than 10 per 
cent of those did she express views which diverged from the majority 
position. Between the unanimous and majority opinions, one can see that 
Justice Wilson was often in agreement with her colleagues. Indeed, 
where she agreed, she was likely to sign on wholeheartedly. 
The picture is quite different when one considers the 179 opinions 
that bear her name as author. Here, on the contrary, is a portrait of 
divergence. Together, the unanimous and majority decisions account for 
only 35 per cent of her authored opinions. The rest are variations on the 
theme of difference. And if a little less than one third of that difference 
emerges as “dissent” (divergence over result), a little more than one third 
takes the form of “concurrence” (divergence over reasons, whether 
expressed against a stable centre, or in the context of a plurality 
judgment). One could certainly conclude, at least in the case of Bertha 
Wilson, that her opinions make visible the centrality of difference in her 
written judgments. 
2. The Supreme Court of Canada 
Difference is inevitably a comparative concept, so it is interesting to 
consider not only the differences between her written and signed 
opinions, but differences that might be visible where her practices of 
judgment are set alongside the practices of those judges with whom she 
sat. What might this wider lens of inquiry make visible? In Table 2 
below we provide some (loose) comparative data on the 15 judges who, 
at various times, sat on the bench with Bertha Wilson. In columns 2 and 
3 are the total number of unanimous and divided cases in which that 
judge participated. Because we are highlighting the question of 
“difference”, the columns that follow refer only to those non-unanimous 
cases: cases where a judicial difference of opinion produced two or more 
written texts. Column 4 thus provides us a sense of the frequency of that 
judge’s authorial participation in the context of those divided judgments: 
how often the judge wrote one of the multiple texts (whether majority, 
concurrence, dissent, or partial dissent). The following columns indicate 
“position” independent of authorial role. Columns 5 and 6 capture the 
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proportion of times that the judge (whether authoring or signing) was 
aligned with a dissent or with a concurrence. The last column bundles 
together all divergent texts (dissents, concurrences, partial dissents) to 
provide an indicator of the general propensity to differ from the majority 
in some fashion. The judges are listed on this table in accordance with 
the final column: from most to least likely to diverge from the majority. 
TABLE 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Justice  
Date of 
Appointment 
 
Unanimous 
Cases 
Divided 
Cases 
Took Part 
 in Writing 
 (%) 
Took Part in 
Dissent 
(%)  
Took Part in 
Concurring
(%) 
Diverged 
from 
Majority 
(%) 
L’Heureux-
Dubé ♀ 
15/04/1987 
340 531 42.7 28.1 31.5 63.3 
Wilson ♀ 
04/03/1982 302 250 55.2 23.2 32.4 59.6 
McLachlin ♀ 
30/03/1989 472 555 43.8 19.6 23.6 46.1 
La Forest 
16/01/1985 306 467 38.8 12.0 30.4 45.2 
Lamer  
28/03/1980 397 502 44.5 13.4 29.1 45.0 
Sopinka  
24/05/1988 207 382 46.1 17.3 25.7 44.8 
McIntyre 
01/01/1979 407 183 37.2 16.4 23.5 43.7 
Stevenson 
17/09/1990 27 70 25.7 14.3 28.8 42.9 
Beetz  
01/01/1974  490 134 22.4 11.1 29.1 41.6 
Dickson 
 26/03/1973 486 229 39.3 12.2 27.9 40.5 
Estey  
29/09/1977 384 107 42.1 17.8 17.8 37.4 
Gonthier 
01/02/1989 404 506 17.2 12.5 21.3 35.2 
Chouinard 
24/09/1979 289 86 16.3 12.8 20.9 34.9 
Cory  
01/02/1989    267 397 35.5 9.8 19.4 31.0 
Le Dain  
29/05/1984  97 70 30.0 5.7 24.3 30.0 
Average 325 298 35.8 15.0 25.7 42.8 
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There are limits to the conclusions one can draw from this table. 
Comparisons here can only be loose ones, since the judges on this table 
were appointed at different times, and can thus be understood as 
occupying different, if overlapping, streams of time; Chief Justice 
McLachlin is still a sitting judge, of course, and so the numbers for her 
are still a work in progress. Further, the aggregated numbers for each 
judge do not distinguish Charter5 from non-Charter cases. One might 
well expect an increase in divided cases with the adoption of the Charter, 
as judges grappled with contingent and controversial social issues using 
new legal instruments. Table 2 places together judges who participated 
primarily in cases heard before the Constitution Act, 1982, with judges 
who worked exclusively during the post-repatriation era. As the Table 
shows, one-half of the judges sat on courts where less than one-half the 
total cases produced disagreement, while the other half produced 
judgments in the reverse situation. And of course, though all the judges 
here overlapped with Justice Wilson, not all of them overlapped with 
each other. Nonetheless, the numbers do provide snapshots for each 
judge, a snapshot making visible patterns linked to judicial difference. 
Returning to Justice Wilson, we see that she is second in the list of 
judges “most likely to disagree”. The top position is held by Justice 
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, often referred to as “The Great Dissenter”. 
Justice Wilson, however, is not far behind, taking second place. And 
indeed, if one looks at the column which captures the rate of concurring 
opinions, Justice Wilson holds first place. There is, of course, another 
aspect of Table 2 that is unavoidably visible: the three judges most likely 
to disagree with the majority position in divided cases are also the first 
three (and at the time, the only three) women on the Supreme Court. 
Their position at the top of the Table makes it nearly impossible not to 
re-invoke the question posed in the title of the Betcherman Lecture. And 
one could be forgiven for ironically responding with the observation 
that, whether or not women judges will make a difference, it appears that 
they will certainly differ.6  
Focusing again on Justice Wilson, there is a further observation to be 
made. Table 2 shows that Justice Wilson “took part in writing” in over 
                                                                                                             
5
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
6
 For an extended meditation on this point, see Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, 
“Les femmes juges feront-elles véritablement une différence? Réflexions sur les décisions des 
femmes juges à la Cour suprême du Canada” (2005) C.J.W.L. 27. 
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55 per cent of the divided cases in which she participated. This is not 
only 20 points above the average participation rate of 35 per cent, but is 
also nearly 10 points ahead of her closest competitor, Justice John 
Sopinka (with a rate of 46 per cent). Justice Wilson is visibly in the lead 
in terms of participation in writing. And of course, as we noted earlier, 
when Justice Wilson was the author of an opinion, that opinion 
frequently expressed a divergent view: she authored 65 concurrences, 51 
dissents and 22 majorities. In short, in the context of practices of 
authorship in divided cases, she was much less likely to be writing for 
the majority, than to be writing in disagreement. The sheer magnitude of 
the numbers is worthy of note. Between the three of them, Justices 
Wilson, L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin are responsible for a 
significant proportion of the divergent opinions produced by the Court as 
a whole. 
But what are we to make of this corpus of divergent opinions — 
descriptions of “law-that-might- have-been”?7 What is the place of these 
outsider opinions, of these expressions from the margins? At the outset, 
one might reply that dissent should not be understood as marginal. 
Certainly, the tradition of dissent is strongly defended by many 
proponents for reasons that are well canvassed in the literature. Dissent 
is said to safeguard the integrity of the judicial institution;8 sustain a 
robust ongoing legal dialogue across multiple constituencies; fill a 
“prophetic” function, providing a source of guidance for the resolution 
of similar issues in the future, sowing the seeds of innovation which 
sometimes “take root in the spirit of the law”.9 Some dissents are so 
                                                                                                             
7
 These dissents are articulated in what Amsterdam and Bruner might identify as “noetic 
space”. Noetic space is the term they use to describe the distinctive imaginative space maintained in 
every culture. It is the space linked to “a distinctively human mental capacity that compels us to 
project our imaginations beyond the ordinary, the expectable, the legitimate — and to involve others 
in our imaginings”. Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law: How Courts Rely 
on Storytelling, and How Their Stories Change the Ways We Understand the Law — and Ourselves 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), at 235. For an extended discussion of dissent and 
noetic space, see Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “I Beg to Differ: Questions about Law, 
Language and Dissent” in Logan Atkinson & Diana Majury, eds., Law, Mystery & the Humanities: 
Collected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming) [hereinafter “I Beg to 
Differ”]. 
8
 Some interesting observations on the darker (gendered) side of “collegiality”, see the 
comments of Bertha Wilson in Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), at 152-55, and 415 (see notes 11 and 12) [hereinafter 
“Judging Bertha Wilson”]. 
9
 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?” (2000) 38 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 495-517, at para. 47. 
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celebrated that they become “canonical”,10 some dissenters are claimed 
by some communities as truth-tellers, prophetically breaking new paths 
or speaking truth to power.  
And yet, this validation of dissent as structurally necessary in our 
legal order, coexists alongside an equally dominant tradition which treats 
dissent and dissenters as somewhat tangential to the “main event” which 
is what a majority opinion produces: binding precedential law. So, 
putting aside particular “canonical” dissents (like Justice Wilson’s 
concurrence in R. v. Morgentaler,11 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent in 
R. v. Seaboyer,12 or Justice McLachlin’s (as she then was) dissent in 
Norberg v. Wynrib),13 there is a default tendency to identify dissent as 
somewhat of an outsider practice, and thus to see the women’s 
heightened propensity to dissent as evidence that they were “isolated at 
one edge of the Court”, “left outside the dominant decision-making 
coalitions”, or as “very much on the fringes looking on rather than at the 
centre helping to steer”.14  
And yet, there is something in this understanding of the women 
judges’ heightened dissent as a marginal or marginalizing practice that 
strikes us as incomplete. Certainly, it does not fully accord with our 
experiences as readers of those dissenting opinions.15 Nor does it accord 
with our experiences as law clerks at the Court, observing the processes 
through which written judicial opinions (majority and dissenting alike) 
came into existence. The production of dissenting opinions seemed as 
important a part of the Court’s work as was the production of majority 
opinions. Further, understanding dissent as marginal is simply 
inconsistent with the empirical data presented in Table 2 above. The 
numbers in Table 2, far from portraying differences of opinion as 
marginal, document the prevalence of divided decisions on the Court. 
                                                                                                             
10
 Anita S. Krishnakumar, “On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent” (2000) 52 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 781. 
11
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.). 
12
 [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.). 
13
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 60, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.). 
14
 Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 2000), at 138 and 155. 
15
 Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “La dissidence judiciaire : réflexions 
préliminaires sur les émotions, la raison et les passions du droit/Judicial Dissent: Early Reflections 
on Emotion, Reason and Passion in Law” in Marie-Claire Belleau & Francois Lacasse, eds., Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé à la Cour suprême du Canada, 1987-2002 (Québec: Wilson & Lafleur, 2004), at 
699. 
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Note that fully one-half of the judges on the Court participated in many 
more divided than unanimous cases. Justice Wilson, arriving at the Court 
at the same time as the repatriated Constitution, was placed at a moment 
in the Court’s history where this increase in divided cases was 
happening.  
And while we are intrigued by the status of the first three women as 
the top dissenters, it is also interesting to consider the judges who come 
out at the other end of the scale: Justices Le Dain, Cory and Chouinard. 
Putting aside the question of whether it matters that the three judges least 
likely to dissent were all men, it is worth acknowledging just what that 
“non-dissenter” status means. It means that Justice Le Dain, who in the 
divided cases was least likely to disagree with the majority, nonetheless 
diverged from the majority opinion (albeit more commonly on reasons 
than on results) 30 per cent of the time. Thirty per cent seems 
sufficiently high a number to throw into question the characterization of 
disagreement as marginal. Even in its mapping of differences between 
judges, Table 2 makes it abundantly clear that the difference is central to 
the work of judging. There is no judge who has not been a participant in 
judicial conflict, no judge who has not been the author of a divergent 
judicial text. Every judge has had the occasion of diverging from the 
majority, of occupying the role of dissenter, whether on reasons, results 
or both.  
That being said, the empirical snapshot above does seem to show 
difference operating at a higher level in the work of Justice Wilson. And 
further, those differences were often of a particular kind. While she often 
disagreed with the majority result, she was more frequently in 
disagreement with their reasons, seeing something that was missing, 
something that needed to be added, something that required comment, 
another direction to be taken, a different principle to be applied. Legal 
scholars have paid relatively little theoretical attention to the 
concurrence as a form of judicial dissent, but one can readily see that 
concurrences play an extremely important part in the work of Justice 
Wilson.  
The statistics also make it apparent that attention needs to be paid to 
the concept of “authorship”. Table 2 makes visible the heightened rate at 
which Justice Wilson participated in writing opinions in divided cases. It 
was not simply that she sometimes saw things differently from the 
majority; she more frequently expressed those differences in the context 
of a written opinion bearing her name. Much of Justice Wilson’s 
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energies on the Court were channelled, it seems, into “voicing” an 
opinion — that is, articulating her own view of the law in her own voice. 
But our choice of words here of course brings us back to the Betcherman 
Lecture, with Justice Wilson’s reference to Carol Gilligan’s work, In a 
Different Voice.16 While it is clear that Justice Wilson frequently 
authored opinions, it is less clear what conclusions can be drawn on the 
basis of that authorship. What is the relationship between one’s views 
and one’s voice? Is “voice” just a matter of style, or does it express 
something about the identity or character of the speaker? In what ways 
might judicial opinions (dissenting or otherwise) provide us with 
evidence of a different voice? Would we find difference in the words 
chosen, or topics dealt with? Is the difference to be found simply in the 
fact that those words were expressed by the first woman on the Supreme 
Court?  
We are reminded here of Foucault’s classic essay “What is an 
Author?”, where he poses his theme using a line from Beckett: “‘What 
does it matter who is speaking,’ someone said, ‘what does it matter who 
is speaking.’”17 But that is exactly the question made visible in the 
empirical data. How might we theorize or understand these various 
differences in the opinions that judges voice? Do those differences 
matter at all? What are the complications we encounter when trying to 
think through questions of judicial authorship? In the next section, we 
offer some reflections emerging from our experiences with counting 
texts, and trying to understand the place of difference in the making of 
judicial opinions. More specifically, we pay some attention to the 
relational dimensions of judicial writing, with its combination of sounds, 
stemming both from collaboration and unique voices. 
III. REFLECTIONS ON COUNTING TEXTS 
In what follows, we temporarily step back from the content of 
specific texts (whether dissenting, majority or unanimous), as well as 
from those texts’ putative authors. Instead of attempting to explain the 
prevalence of dissenting texts through reference to their authors (i.e., 
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 Carol Gilligan,  In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader 
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women dissent more because they see the world differently), we invite 
the reader to reflect with us on the fact of these texts. Here, our thinking 
has been influenced by Dorothy Smith’s institutional ethnographical 
approach. This approach presses us to take a different approach to 
familiar sociological objects (here, for example, dissenting judicial 
texts). Rather than beginning with the objects themselves (for example, 
specific dissenting opinions), it tries to get at the forms of social 
knowledge that are implicated in the production of those objects, the 
social relations which organize the world of experience. The focus is on 
the ways activities are organized and “how they are articulated to the 
social relations of the larger social and economic process”.18 In the 
context of this project, we are thus challenged to reflect on the work 
processes which organize and coordinate the production of judicial texts. 
What might such an approach suggest about difference, authorship and 
the making of judicial opinions?  
1. Texts 
At the outset, it is worth stating a point that might seem obvious: 
legal relations, part of the larger relations of ruling, are essentially text-
mediated.19 Law, as we practice it in Canada, is close to unthinkable in 
the absence of the judicial and legislative texts which assert, direct, lead, 
coordinate, regulate and organize. The work of the Supreme Court is the 
production of texts. These texts (judicial opinions) are central to the 
reproduction of law’s order; the stability and authority of law is in large 
measure a product of the replicability of its texts. Conceding the degrees 
of freedom possible in interpretation, it is also the case that interpreters 
in various locations are required to grapple with “the same” texts. The 
textual mediation of law’s forms of organization is, Dorothy Smith 
might argue, “fundamental to its characteristic abstracted, extra-local 
                                                                                                             
18
 Dorothy E. Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1987), at 152 [hereinafter “The Everyday World as Problematic”]. 
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 Dorothy E. Smith, “Texts and the Ontology of Organizations and Institutions” (2001) 7 
Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies 159 [hereinafter “‘Texts and the Ontology of 
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forms and its curious capacity to reproduce its order in the same way in 
an indefinite variety of actual local contexts”.20  
This is a point that is obvious, and yet of great significance. As 
Dorothy Smith reminds us, in our text-mediated societies, texts are far 
more than simple “ideas”. They enter into the construction of social and 
physical environments by coordinating activity: they are “key devices in 
hooking people’s activities in particular local settings and at particular 
times into the transcending organization of the ruling relations”.21 Legal 
texts are key documents in the construction and maintenance of justice. 
The texts are not just statements of law, or assertions about what the 
world is, but are “active”, operating often as speech acts.22 These “speech 
acts/texts” are brought to bear on the lives and bodies of the litigants 
before them, but also have real impacts even on those who do not know 
of the text’s existence. We tend, of course, to think of this active power 
of the text primarily in the context of opinions voiced by the majority, as 
if those are the only decisions which have the force to make their speech 
acts real.23 And yet, though dissenting opinions may not operate in quite 
the same way as majority opinions, they are texts produced by the 
Supreme Court. That is, the active production of divergent judicial texts 
is part of the work of the Court.  
This point could seem banal because, in Canada, we tend to take the 
presence of dissenting texts for granted. But it is worth remembering that 
judicial disagreement does not inevitably produce dissenting texts. In 
French appellate courts, by way of comparison, published opinions are 
anonymous and appear as if unanimous. There are no dissenting 
opinions.24 This does not mean that judges in French appellate courts 
cannot or do not disagree. They can and do, but disagreements between 
judges as they attempt to reach a decision are protected by le secret du 
délibéré. That disagreement is not made visible in the judicial opinion, 
which is produced under the nom de plume of “The Court.” The resulting 
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 Dorothy E. Smith, Texts, Facts, and Femininity: Exploring the Relations of Ruling 
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text may well reflect the unanimous opinion of the judges, but it may 
also reflect the opinion of only a majority. Differences and 
disagreements may exist between the judges, but they do not emerge in 
the form of a published dissenting text.  
Our own Court produces just such texts, and they are texts marked 
by judicial power. These texts give voice to words of dissent, words 
uttered by a judge acting in the capacity of judge. Those words remain 
enrobed with the authority of judicial office.25 This makes a dissenting 
opinion significantly different from other attempts to persuade or 
convince. The words of a dissenting opinion are a direct challenge, and 
the majority may be required to enter into dialogue. The dissent has the 
ability to force the majority to respond, to answer, to explain, to shift or 
to accommodate. And even where a majority does not respond directly, 
the very fact of the dissent often means that the majority reasons have 
been written differently than they would have been in the absence of a 
dissent. While, strictly speaking, only the majority opinion has the 
ability to make its view real in the world, the voice of dissent (even if 
itself not the law) may have played a part in constituting the shape of the 
majority against which it is issued. In the process of constructing the 
judgment, the first draft of the majority opinion often is transformed to 
meet arguments raised in minority reasons, or to muster support from 
other judges. Because of contact with minority opinions in the process of 
judgment writing, the officially published majority opinion is often very 
different from its first draft. This is also true for early drafts of minority 
opinions. In the context of a divided Court, majority and minority views 
emerge in conjunction with each other. Majority and diverging reasons 
are part of the same event. And though they are voiced in the names of 
particular judges, there is a very real sense in which they can also be 
understood as part of a more deeply collaborative venture. 
The term “collaborative” here is not shorthand for “collegial”, nor 
does it assume happy inclusive working relations. Collaborations can be 
integrative and inclusive, involve exclusion and excision, result in 
unanimous agreement, or generate a series of fractured texts. So, for 
example, some scholars, considering dissenting texts written in the style 
of majority opinions, speculate that those the texts are failed majority 
opinions; and that they provide us with a window into conflicts and 
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struggles between the judges of the Court.26 This is one possibility. But it 
may be the case that such an opinion was known to be a dissenting one 
from the beginning, and that the judge, supported by his or her 
colleagues, actively chose to write it in that style, targeting a future 
audience, wanting the full argument to be comprehensible on its own 
terms. Certainly, the lure of the detective story solved is always there in 
our efforts to figure out what went on behind the scenes, how the various 
judges feel about each other, and how the texts came to be the texts that 
they are. However, in the end, as Smith might remind us, it is the text 
(and not the stories behind the text) that continues to act in the world, 
and thus it is the text that remains our focus. 
There are many ways to use legal texts to think about the relations 
between judges that might have shaped the resulting opinions.27 But our 
point is a slightly different one: whether texts are produced in hostile or 
hospitable conditions, those conditions are nonetheless collaborative. No 
dissenting opinion can come into existence without a majority opinion 
that cannot adjust itself to accommodate it. The majority judges may 
have as much responsibility for the shape of a dissenting opinion as does 
the judge in whose name the dissent is published. In this sense, though 
our empirical snapshot directed our attention to Justice Wilson’s 
heightened propensity to author dissenting and concurring reasons, it is 
interesting to consider the ways that these heightened statistics might tell 
us as much about the majority judges’ inability to accommodate Justice 
Wilson’s views, as they tell us about Justice Wilson herself.  
2. Collaboration 
The suggestion that we think of practices of dissent through the lens 
of collaboration takes us back to Dorothy Smith, and institutional 
ethnography. The approach she proposes is one that sees texts as active, 
and which takes seriously the work involved in constituting those texts. 
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The questions she asks us are, How does it happen as it does? and, How 
do these texts come to be constituted?  
The simple account of collaboration imagines nine judges sitting in 
the conference room, discussing a case. Each judge has read the 
materials, and has deeply considered the evidence, facts and argument. 
Each judge, while honouring the demands of impartiality, hears the case 
through the lens of his or her own history of individual life experiences 
(military service, disability, trial lawyers, member of bar, children, 
single, childless, deaths, law school and associations), experiences that 
combine to produce particular attitudes and ideologies. All this provides 
the context that enables the judge to come to a decision — to “vote” on 
the issue. One might imagine, in this situation, the judges voting, tallying 
results and assigning various judges to draft the texts that capture the 
views of the various voting blocks. 
Such an approach largely focuses our attention on the characters of 
the nine judges, seeking to see in them evidence of the results they arrive 
at.28 It presumes that “voting” is the main dimension of judicial work, 
and tends to underemphasize the “constructing” portion of the 
collaborative venture. Indeed, in the common story, whether the Court 
produces a single unanimous decision, or a linked set of majority and 
dissenting opinions, there is a tendency to speak of the resulting judicial 
texts as primarily the work of the authors in whose name those opinions 
are published. There is relatively little discussion of the collaborative 
dimensions producing those texts. Such an approach seriously 
underemphasizes the vast amount of input that comes together in the 
production of the finalized texts. It tends to underemphasize the ways 
that (particularly in the context of judgments authored by “The Court”) 
the judges must work together to construct a text that, in its 
representation of the opinions of all, cannot be said to be the product of 
any single judge. 
In looking to “the work”, Smith suggests we take a more generous 
approach, one which attempts to understand and weave together as many 
participants as possible. In short, she asks us to consider the “concerted 
sequences or courses of social action implicating more than one 
individual whose participants are not necessarily present or known to 
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one another.”29 Certainly, there are descriptions of the work of judges 
that do provide much more expansive accounts of the processes and 
players involved, accounts which emphasize the involvement of far more 
than nine people in the production of Supreme Court opinions.30 
One might account for the pre-screening (leave to appeal) processes 
that determine which cases will and will not be heard. Once a case is 
through the filter, the Registrar’s office and Supreme Court Rules govern 
the materials that can and must be submitted, the documents that will 
come before the Court, the number of pages and the organization of 
those materials. What these materials might be is variable depending on 
the work performed by a variety of players at lower levels in the 
adjudication process. In some cases, clients are self-represented; in 
others, there are lawyers. Even here, there is a great diversity of 
resources standing behind the counsel of record. There are often teams of 
lawyers involved, along with articling students and staff, all in the 
production of the record that the Court will have before it. Intervenors 
also play an important part, placing new arguments in front of the Court. 
These interventions can play a big part in the construction of the 
eventual opinion, as it is not at all uncommon for large portions of a 
factum to appear directly in a court opinion. 
Once the material arrives at the Court, there are additional processes 
around that material’s diffusion and absorption. There are staff lawyers 
at the Court who produce summaries of materials, facts and issues. There 
are three law clerks in each chamber, available to do extra reading and 
research, and produce pre-hearing bench memos for the judges on 
various aspects of the cases. There is the hearing itself, and the 
conversations that occur during it with the various advocates before the 
Court. New questions and arguments made during the hearing can shape 
and influence the case before the Court. Judges also note the limitations 
placed on them in terms of the questions posed, the issues presented, the 
strategies of the argumentation, the arguments presented by intervenors, 
etc. As Lamer J. put it, the Court is “a prisoner” of the case presented to 
them.31 
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There is the post-hearing work, often beginning with a post-hearing 
conference. Different Chief Justices may schedule those conferences in 
ways that place longer or shorter periods of time before the first 
discussions. There are conversations between judges to discuss issues, 
sometimes documented in memos, sometimes occurring in hallways; 
there are draft judgments and memos between judges; memos from and 
to clerks; conversations between clerks and their judges; conversations 
between clerks across chambers. The question of how much of this 
happens in memo and how much happens informally is also variable, 
and different sources give different accounts. The central point for us 
here is simply to note that these processes involve a number of parties, 
the parties and processes are themselves socially related, and those 
relations are part of the work processes through which particular judicial 
texts are formed. 
Also crucial is that the judges hearing one case are also considering 
their responses in terms of other cases recently heard, other cases 
scheduled for hearings and other cases in the public arena. As the judges 
are making decisions in particular cases, other cases and precedents are 
in the background, playing a part in how cases are written, even where 
those other precedents do not necessarily feature expressly in the texts. 
Existing case law is of course playing a part in structuring the resulting 
texts. The law itself (as understood in different ways by different judges) 
is one of the players influencing the production of the judicial texts. 
One of the challenges is in linking these practices of collaboration to 
our understanding of judicial “authorship”. At the end of the day, all 
judicial opinions are inscribed under the name of an author. Generally 
that means under the name of a particular judge, though the author may 
also be in the name of “The Court”. But the practices of collaboration 
noted above sit in tension with our traditional ways of attributing 
authorship. There is a way in which we all know that decisions implicate 
all judges who sign on to them. However, we attribute primary 
responsibility for that decision to the judge in whose name it is inscribed, 
speaking as though the text captures the voice and view of a particular 
judge. The judges who sign opinions, on the other hand, are rarely 
characterized in the media as having responsibility for the production of 
those opinions. There is less glory (and culpability) in practices of 
signing than in practices of authoring. Where judges are “mere” 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) VOICING AN OPINION 73 
 
signatories, they are less likely to be held publically “responsible” for 
their participation.32 It is as if only two or three judges are active: they 
construct draft opinions and offer them to the judicial market, where the 
remaining judges exercise their market power by choosing to invest their 
judicial votes/dollars in one product rather than another.  
For us, in thinking about the authorship of judicial opinions, we have 
found the analogy to cinematic texts to be a useful one. For while it is 
common to speak of a film as being by Hitchcock, Jarmusch or 
Spielberg, those films are textual objects whose shape is deeply 
determined by many players in addition to the director under whose 
name the final product is inscribed. Indeed, the film as text requires the 
collaborative participation of many players. The editing or lighting or 
casting or sound choices are fundamental to the filmic text that is 
produced. Star Wars, for example, would not be the same film without 
the John Williams score: one has only to hum the first few notes of 
Darth Vader’s theme to bring the villain to life. The point is not that the 
“real” author of the film is John Williams and not George Lucas. From 
our point of view, to even articulate the question thus (to focus on who is 
the “real” author) is partly to miss the point: a filmic text is a 
collaborative venture, inscribed generally under the name of a director.  
There is, we believe, an analogy to opinions of the Supreme Court. 
They too are texts that must be produced, and the process of producing 
them is a deeply collaborative one. The process is not as simple as 
judges “signing on” as if they are buying goods at a grocery store, 
selecting the reasons that most fit their mood or style. Judges are more 
deeply involved in the construction of the reasons than that, and 
authorship is a more complicated concept. There are many inputs to the 
final product. In noting the participation of the parties, lawyers, articling 
students, staff members, lower courts, academics and law clerks in this 
process, our point is not to make a claim about “the real author” behind 
the text. It is rather to acknowledge that the processes of producing 
Court opinions are collaborative in a non-trivial way.  
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Written opinions are, in our system, generally produced under the 
name of a particular judge, but that judge’s name can in some ways be 
best understood as a cipher or a stamp: it does link us imaginatively with 
the voice of a particular person, but it also stands as name/function 
which acknowledges the existence of a particular collectively authored 
text. Perhaps an example can serve to make clear the insight about the 
complexity of the collaboration in the production of the text, insights 
that might lead us to think differently about the depth of collaborative 
participation by Justice Wilson in the work of producing unanimous 
decisions — and not only those bearing her name as author. Let us 
consider one of the judgments in which Justice Wilson participated in an 
unnamed fashion: the unanimous decision of “The Court” in Tremblay v. 
Daigle.33 
3. Tremblay v. Daigle: A Study in Collaboration 
In 1989, a pregnant Chantal Daigle left her boyfriend Jean-Guy 
Tremblay. She refused his offer of marriage, reporting him for having 
physically assaulted her. In return, he obtained an interlocutory 
injunction from the Quebec Superior Court, preventing her from having 
an abortion. He had argued that, under section 1 of the Quebec Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms,34 the foetus was a human being that had 
a right to life. As Daigle was approaching the 20th week of her 
pregnancy, the Supreme Court authorized an expedited hearing, pulling 
judges back from summer vacations and engagements abroad to hear 
arguments about the rights of the foetus. Halfway through the hearing, 
council for Daigle was advised (and thus required to advise the Court) 
that, even in the face of the injunction and the hearing before the Court, 
his client had disguised herself to cross the border to the U.S., where she 
had obtained an abortion. After an hour-long recess, and the completion 
of the hearing, Chief Justice Dickson announced that the Court would 
unanimously grant the appeal, with reasons to follow. Three months 
later, the nine judges, under the name of “The Court”, held unanimously 
that such an injunction could not stand. Neither the Quebec Charter nor 
the Civil Code35 conveyed legal personhood upon the foetus. There was 
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no legal basis to the argument that the father’s interest in the foetus he 
helped to create gave him the right to veto a woman’s decisions in 
respect of the foetus she was carrying.  
Generally, this is as much background as we would have on a case: 
it is a matter of public record. However, this is one case where we have 
more background into the conditions of production of the text. The 
biographies of Justices Brian Dickson and Bertha Wilson contain stories 
which would have once circulated more narrowly.36 Sharpe and Roach in 
particular provide some rich background to the case, having had 
exclusive access to 200 boxes of Chief Justice Dickson’s personal 
papers, including his working files from the Court.37 That is, they had his 
annotated copies of the documents, pre-hearing bench memos prepared 
by law clerks, judgment memos, memoranda on the draft reasons of 
other judges, conference memoranda prepared by Chief Justice Dickson 
shortly after the oral argument (containing the tentative views of his 
colleagues after their first discussions), and memoranda to and from 
other members of the Court commenting on draft reasons. And so, nearly 
20 years after the case, biographical and historical work does enable us 
to see behind the name of “The Court” in which the decision was 
penned, and to see further into the work processes behind the ultimate 
text, a text that would require a decision from the judges on both “result” 
and “reasons”. We think a few of these are worthy of emphasis here.  
First, the Dickson biography shows us that the decision to allow the 
appeal was not necessarily as self-evident as the unanimous judicial 
opinion suggests. Sharpe and Roach tell us that several members of the 
Court felt that Daigle had abused the court process, and should have 
been subject to an action for contempt of court.38 Chief Justice Dickson, 
we are told, “was furious and he wanted to end the case on the spot”.39 
At this point, however, Justice Beverley McLachlin (as she then was) 
commented that the Court should put itself in the position of Chantal 
Daigle, a desperate young woman who did not want to carry the child of 
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the man who had abused her. This comment seems to have had a big 
impact on Justice Dickson, and to have played a part in leading him to 
change his mind. The story is interesting in a number of ways. It shows 
us that unanimous decisions do not necessarily reflect easy agreement, 
but may have to be struggled for. It also makes visible the complexity of 
ways that judges participate in the decision-making, and the kinds of 
interventions (invisible to the rest of us) that contribute to a collective 
decision. It is a reminder of the importance of having a variety of 
divergent groups represented on the Court, in order to facilitate better 
decision-making.40 
Another significant element is that the judgment was delivered as 
unanimous and anonymous. It was authored not by one of the nine 
embodied judges, but rather by “The Court”. By publishing the opinion 
in this fashion, the judges of the Court emphasized the unanimity of their 
position. They also attempted to construct a text that did not speak in the 
“voice” of any particular judge. This not only makes it difficult for 
people to “re-politicize” the case through speculation about the judge in 
whose name the case is issued, it also serves to more visibly make the 
text speak in a voice beyond the individual judge, to speak instead the 
voice of “the Court”, the voice of “the law”.  
There certainly is a politics to the attribution of authorship to “the 
Court” as a whole. But the use of such a device also makes visible the 
collaborative nature of the venture: the nine judges have had to agree 
that the judgment will appear in the name of no one, though somehow a 
material text must be constructed in which the opinion of the Court will 
be voiced.  
The Dickson biography gives us some insight into how that anony-
mous and unanimous text was materially produced. We know that the 
first draft came from Justice Dickson’s chambers. We also know that 
Justices La Forest and Gonthier had concerns with parts of that text: 
Justice La Forest indicated that he would be writing separate reasons. 
For the reasons to be published unanimously, they would have to be 
changed. Discussion, debate, compromise and modification ensued. 
Though the judges had unanimously agreed on the result at the hearing, 
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it would take months before they produced a text in a singular voice. 
Agreement on reasons did not imply agreement on results. If Justice 
Dickson’s chambers were sending out drafts, the work of constructing a 
draft that could be agreed upon was very much a collective enterprise, 
requiring active work by many judges.  
The background texts around this case make it clear that the Court 
was very conscious of its place in the “intertextual hierarchy”.41 The 
judges knew that they were not only dealing with a private law issue 
between Tremblay and Daigle, but were also being asked to weigh in on 
questions about “standing” (the rights of ordinary citizens to challenge 
laws that did not affect them personally), human dignity, fetal rights and 
abortion. Even though the final text is silent in this regard, the Court, in 
hearing Tremblay v. Daigle,42 were still standing in the shadow cast by 
their 1988 decision in R. v. Morgentaler.43 They would still be operating 
against the reverberations of Justice Wilson’s important concurrence, in 
which she had said that most men could only respond imaginatively at 
best to the dilemmas confronting the pregnant woman. Even though the 
opinions make no reference to that case, it is clearly a participant in the 
unanimous reasons of the Court in this case. It is worth considering then 
the lack of a concurrence from Justice Wilson. The decision not to say 
something more about women and choice in the interests of producing a 
unanimous opinion may be seen as another indicator of collaborative 
practice. Of the final text, we know that Justice Wilson said she “worked 
very hard on that to get the judgment by the Court” and that she “was 
happy with the way that one worked out in the end”.44 
In this rare glimpse behind the screen, we can see the extent to 
which the production of law is a collaborative process, and indeed, more 
deeply collaborative than we tend to acknowledge. While one could look 
behind the voice of “The Court”, and claim that it is really the voice of 
“Dickson”, such a conclusion would miss the mark. Even if the text was 
written in Chief Justice Dickson’s hand (or typed on his keyboard), there 
is much in the opinion that simply cannot be said to “be Dickson”. Given 
the compromises necessary, we know that there are things there that are 
                                                                                                             
41
 The phrase is Julia Kristeva’s. Dorothy Smith uses it to identify texts which govern the 
rules for the production of other texts. See Texts, Facts, and Femininity, supra, note 20. 
42
 Supra, note 33. 
43
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 80 (S.C.C.). 
44
 Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 8, at 299, note 47. 
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not a reflection of his personal opinion. The pieces of the story shared 
here make visible the active participation of at least five judges in the 
constructing of the text. Access to the personal papers of the other judges 
would undoubtedly show us even more. In short, the judicial opinion 
produced, even if the words chosen can be said to be articulated in the 
style of one judge, is a product of a number of interventions. It is much 
more than the sum total of nine votes. It is both more and less than the 
opinion of the nine judges standing in support of the text from behind the 
pen name of “The Court”.  
IV. CONCLUSION: RETURNING TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS 
OF JUSTICE WILSON 
We return then to the beginning and the question that Justice Wilson 
asked in the Betcherman Lecture: Will women judges make a 
difference? Our empirical project, and the process of counting opinions, 
has raised more questions for us than it answered. The empirical data 
affirms that “difference” is indeed visible in the work of Justice Wilson: 
she wrote the highest proportion of concurring opinions, was second in 
dissents only to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, and had by far the highest rate 
of authored opinions in divided cases. But what are we to make of these 
numbers, of these “differences”? What difference does difference make? 
Or rather, what role might these differences play in the making of law?  
The heightened patterns of dissent and concurrence in the work of 
Justice Wilson (or indeed in the first three women judges) do not lead us 
to conclude that women judges judge “differently”. Nor did those 
studying the early Charter cases. They concluded that the women judges 
were as likely to disagree with each other as with their male colleagues. 
The fact of gender does not enable us to predict how a judge will vote. 
Neither do we conclude from the heightened rate of dissent that Justice 
Wilson (or women judges more generally) disagreed with greater ease. 
The numbers alone tell us little about the felt experience of dissent, or 
about the cost to a judge of articulating a minority view. Furthermore, if 
it is the case that all judges engage in practices of dissent, it is not the 
case that dissenting comes to all judges with equal ease. Differences in 
both human personality and legal theory play a role here. The point at 
which a judge determines that compromise is impossible and dissent is 
necessary will vary with that judge’s personality, with how that judge 
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understands the balance between law’s contradictory demands for 
stability and responsiveness, and with the judge’s understanding of what 
is at stake in the particular case.  
The French legal system’s rejection of judicial dissent provides a 
useful reminder: some theories of law place a very high premium on 
judicial unanimity. And while our own system authorizes dissent, 
theoretical orientations vary: some judges incline in the direction of 
seeing dissent as generally valuable; others see dissent as a necessary 
evil, to be deployed only where compromise is simply not possible. 
Furthermore, a dissent may be produced as much because of a majority’s 
inability to find a compromise position as because of a dissenter’s 
propensity to disagree. The fact of dissent cannot lead us to draw firm 
conclusions about the personality or theoretical understandings of Justice 
Wilson or any other particular dissenting judge.  
Differences visible in the statistics encourage attention to authorship, 
but at the same time, the collaborative process of decision-making 
challenges traditional assumptions about the nature of authorship. There 
are some good reasons, for example, to distinguish Justice Wilson in her 
“judge-function” from Justice Wilson in her “author-function”. The 
authorship of a judicial opinion (whether majority or dissenting) is not 
the same as the authorship of an article, a novel or a speech. And yet, a 
Supreme Court opinion is akin in many ways to a cinematic text. Both 
are produced under the name of an identifiable author/director, one who 
plays an important part in the generation of the text. And both texts, in 
spite of being signed under the name of a particular person, are produced 
under conditions of deep collaboration. It is important to remain 
conscious of this collaborative dimension when attributing responsibility 
to judicial “authors”. The making of opinions, even solo dissents, 
involves many participants and inputs, and the attaching of a single 
judicial name provides a kind of shorthand for the authorial attribution of 
a collectively generated product.  
Justice Wilson’s own divergent forms of participation in the written 
and signed judgments suggest the importance of paying attention to 
authorship, but it remains important that authorship not be fetishized. 
For while we use authorial names in speaking of particular opinions, it is 
useful to understand those judgments as products of larger collaborative 
ventures. While the opinion bears the signature of a judge, it is too quick 
a leap to say that “the judicial opinion” is equal to “the judge’s opinion”. 
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Other judges are involved as more than simple signatories to another’s 
work.  
There are additional questions about difference. Justice Wilson was 
involved in a great many concurring opinions. Should we treat these as 
similar to or distinct from her dissenting opinions? What difference does 
it make when judges disagree over reasons rather than results? What is 
the difference between a concurrence and a dissent, and what might we 
learn from greater attention to the concurrence as a particular kind of 
legal opinion? Justice Wilson’s opposing forms of participation in the 
signed and authored opinions (primarily with the majority in the signed 
opinions, diverging from the majority in the authored opinions) 
encourage greater attention to the different ways that judges participate 
in the process of constructing judgments, ways that may not always be 
visible in the final texts themselves. Justice Wilson may have disagreed 
at a heightened rate, but she also actively participated in many 
unanimous and majority decisions, and collaborated even in those 
decisions that do not bear her name. Her dissents and concurrences are 
important texts in their own right, opening space for imagining law 
otherwise. They also are important players in the process of constructing 
law, as the clash of difference alters the shape of each opinion produced.  
The empirical snapshot and the reflections about institutional 
ethnography combine to focus our attention on the complexities in the 
production of law, of the many possible ways of thinking about the 
voicing of judicial opinions. Certainly, we are left reflecting on how 
voice matters. Years after reading the text of the Betcherman Lecture, 
we listened to the audio-recording of it posted on the Internet.45 Here, the 
substance of the text echoed in the measured pace and musical lilt of 
Wilson’s Scottish-accented voice. There was something magical in the 
moment of listening. Would the substance of the lecture have been any 
different if issued in a male voice? Or if it had been spoken in a voice 
not carrying the traces of an immigrant’s voyage and experiences? Or in 
the voice of Canada’s 100th rather than first female Supreme Court 
Justice? Does authorship matter? Does voice matter? What difference 
does difference make? What difference did Justice Wilson make? She 
posed for us questions for which she did not have answers, questions that 
remain as provocative and pressing today as they were when she first 
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2%80%9Cwill-women-judges-really-make-a-difference%E2%80%9D-hear-justice-wilsons-speech/>. 
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shouldered the burden of so many expectations. One thing is certain: 
Justice Wilson, whether signing or authoring opinions, whether aligned 
with the majority concurrence or dissent, lent her voice to the making of 
the law in Canada, law that would not have been the same without her.  
